As we approach the first anniversary of the Sendai quake and tsunami, I am steeling myself for the inevitable blanket commentary of a nuclear disaster that never was, while we roundly forget about the genuinely horrific human tragedy of that event with some 20,000 lives lost in 7 minutes of terrifying natural calamity.

It has already begun, with a the release of a report that focusses on the very worst case scenario possible that never actually happened. In a low blow, this report went to media first before experts, leading to unmitigated headlines lifted straight from the report with little critical examination.

So I’m very grateful to my friends Ted and Michael for being early in the response, asking us to think very hard about the stories we choose to tell ourselves. The original article is published here, which is also the best place to leave a comment. Please read on.

Posted Thursday, March 1, 2012, at 4:55 PM ET

With an eye to the first anniversary of the tsunami that killed 20,000 people and caused a partial meltdown at the Fukushima power plant in Japan, a recently formed nongovernmental organization called Rebuild Japan released a report earlier this week on the nuclear incident to alarming media coverage.

Japan Weighed Evacuating Tokyo in Nuclear Crisis,” screamed the New York Times headline, above an article by Martin Fackler that claimed, “Japan teetered on the edge of an even larger nuclear crisis than the one that engulfed the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.”

The larger crisis was a worst-case scenario imagined by Japanese government officials dealing with the situation. If workers at the Fukushima Daiichi plant were evacuated, Fackler writes, some worried “[t]his would have allowed the plant to spiral out of control, releasing even larger amounts of radioactive material into the atmosphere that would in turn force the evacuation of other nearby nuclear plants, causing further meltdowns.”

Fackler quotes former newspaper editor and founder of Rebuild Japan Yoichi Funabashi as saying, “We barely avoided the worst-case scenario, though the public didn’t know it at the time.”

To say that Japan “barely avoided” what another top official called a “demonic chain reaction” of plant meltdowns and the evacuation of Tokyo is to make an extraordinary claim. One shudders at the thought of the hardship, suffering, and accidents that would almost certainly have resulted from any attempt to evacuate a metropolitan area of 30 million people. The Rebuild Japan report has not yet been released to the public, but there is reason to doubt that Japan was anywhere close to executing this nightmare contingency plan.

The same day the New York Times published its story, PBS broadcast a Frontline documentary about the Fukushima meltdown that invites a somewhat different interpretation. In an interview conducted for that program, then-Prime  Minister Naoto Kan suggests that the fear of cascading plant failures was nothing more than panicked speculation among some of his advisers. “I asked many associates to make forecasts,” Kan explained to PBS, “and one such forecast was a worst-case scenario. But that scenario was just something that was possible, it didn’t mean that it seemed likely to happen.”

The authors of the Rebuild Japan report also spoke with Kan, along with about 300 others. According to the Times, these interviews turned up evidence that the Tokyo Electric Power Company was looking to abandon the teetering power plant, a plan that would have significantly worsened the crisis.

But was this ever really going to happen? Kan told PBS that his Cabinet members had said Tepco “wanted to withdraw,” but adds that the company’s CEO “would not say clearly [to Kan] that they wanted to withdraw, or that they wouldn’t withdraw.” The producer of the Frontline documentary, Dan Edge, said in an interview posted to the PBS website that the Fukushima workers he interviewed said they were told they on the evening of March 14 that there would be a complete evacuation, but then told the next morning that there would not be.

All this suggests there was significant confusion and indecision, and there is no question that what happened at Fukushima demands critical investigation and accountability. Whether or not Tepco mismanaged Fukushima after the tsunami hit, there is evidence that company officials had delayed upgrading the plant ahead of time and ignored the risk of a tsunami large enough to breech the seawall.

The Rebuild Japan report seems, on its face, to have been produced by a highly credible team of “30 university professors, lawyers and journalists.” But even a seemingly legitimate study deserves a skeptical eye. Yet Fackler and the Times chose not to quote a single independent expert on nuclear energy besides Rebuild Japan’s Funabashi. It should have been a red flag that Rebuild Japan gave its report to journalists a full week before releasing it to the public, which prevented outside experts from evaluating its claims. Another hint that the report merited a contrary opinion was the fact that it excluded any account from Tepco executives, who refused to be interviewed by Rebuild Japan investigators.

There’s no question that the findings from the Rebuild Japan study merited coverage, but the Times might have shown more awareness of the fallacy of the worst-case scenario. “In any field of endeavor,” wrote physicist Bernard Cohen in his classic 1990 study, The Nuclear Energy Option, “it is easy to concoct a possible accident scenario that is worse than anything that has been previously proposed.” Cohen goes on to spin a scenario of a gasoline spill resulting in out-of-control fires, a disease epidemic, and, eventually, nuclear war.

Cohen concludes his fantastical thought experiment by saying, “I have frequently been told that the probability doesn’t matter—the very fact that such an accident is possible makes nuclear power unacceptable. According to that way of thinking, we have shown that the use of gasoline is not acceptable, and almost any human activity can similarly be shown to be unacceptable. If probability didn’t matter, we would all die tomorrow from any one of thousands of dangers we live with constantly.”

It was perfectly reasonable for the Japanese authorities to have imagined and considered the very worst possible course of events in the aftermath of Fukushima meltdown. But it’s a mistake to oversell the risks of such a scenario in hindsight. Yes, things could have turned out much worse—just as they could have turned out much better. As the Times and the rest of the news media cover the anniversary of the tsunami, they would do well to keep Cohen’s warning in mind.


  1. Nuclear professionals are as much to blame as the media. For decades, we have been spinning our own tall tales of “worst case scenarios” that postulate such physical impossibilities as pressure vessels and containments instantly vaporizing and releasing large portions of the radioactive material to the surrounding environment.

    It was nuclear professionals who made up the idea that 25 feet of water can somehow disappear from the top of a used fuel pool and the idea that if it did, the metal cladding would immediately catch fire.

    These are not “worst case scenarios”, however. They are pure fictions that defy several natural laws. Saying they are possible is roughly equivalent to someone saying that it is possible for me to win a lottery. (I happen to know that will NEVER happen because I NEVER buy any lottery tickets.)

    I watched the Frontline show. It reminded me how utterly frustrated I was to see the stupid effort to attempt to fill a used fuel pool from a helicopter. I cannot believe that the producer implied that the effort did anything – you can see clearly that the VAST majority of the water released went somewhere besides the pool, even during the pass when the pilot thought he hit his target.

    Even if it was remotely possible for all of the water to reach the pool, someone should have pointed out the fact that it would take at least 60 trips of the largest helicopters on the planet to carry enough water to raise the level of a spent fuel pool by an inch. Helicopters just do not have that much lift capacity, especially helicopters that have tungsten plates strapped to them.

    Based on the Frontline commentary, I am even more suspicious that the whole reason for sending those choppers up was to provide dramatic video footage that would make people think that Chernobyl was happening all over again. According to the show, the pilots were thinking about Chernobyl pilots before they even took off. I am pretty sure that antinuclear politicians (or American “nuclear experts”) could have easily made the same diabolical connection.

    1. @Rod I haven’t seen the documentary but it was my understanding that the purpose of the helicopters was to reduce airborne cesium rather than fill the spent fuel pool?

      1. I’ve heard that, but there was no cesium in the air at the time. The people who were making that claim assumed that there was fuel damage occurring in the spent fuel pools.

        The documentary did not talk about airborne contamination, but about attempting to fill the pools.

    2. I read an article yesterday that had a number that made me think back and wonder about Rod’s sums.

      The article says the fuel pool held 1,425 cubic meters of water. Wikipedia says the helicopters were CH-47s, which can lift something like 23,000 pounds, which I make about 10,000 kg, or 10,000 litres of water.

      Let’s knock down a helicopter-load to 7,500 liters and knock up the fuel pool to 1,500 cubic meters = 1,500,000 liters.

      So in this hypothetical case where all the water was reaching the pool rather than being scattered to the four winds, you could fill it with:
      (1,500,000 / 7,500) = 200 helicopters worth.
      …and 60 helicopter runs would fill 3/10 of the pool, which must be at least a few meters.

      Have I lost some zeros somewhere? If not, do I qualify for some kind of pedantry award?

      1. @Edmund in Tokyo

        Thank you for checking my math and memory. I was wrong in my comment above. Here is the back of the envelop calculation that I made in an email I sent on March 17, 2011.

        “It takes a 200,000 liters to raise the level of a pool that is 10 meters wide by 20 meters long by a meter. A CH-46 medium lift helicopter has a capacity of about 3,180 kg. It would require 63 trips to raise the water level one meter if my guess on fuel pool dimensions is reasonable.”

        My comment above was most likely due to the advanced age of my brain or the loss of the cells that I used to pickle on occasion in my younger days. I wrote “inch” when I should have written “meter”. I should have known better than to trust memory. I should have looked through my notes or pulled my envelop back out.

        Of course, neither one of our calculations makes any attempt to allow for the water to go somewhere besides the pool (it is quite a small target from several hundred feet up in the air with a rotating blade blowing it around) or reduces the lift capacity of the helicopter by the weight of the tungsten shielding plates that were used to protect the pilots.

  2. I don’t understand Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s point about the workers being told they’d leave on the evening of the 14th, then being told they’d stay the next morning. How is that supposed to show that TEPCO weren’t going to pull them out? Kan called TEPCO, then stormed over there, overnight.

    So the chronology looks like:
    1) Workers told they’ll pull out.
    2) Kan storms TEPCO.
    3) Workers told they’ll stay.

  3. Rod Adams: “I am even more suspicious that the whole reason for sending those choppers up was to provide dramatic video footage that would make people think that Chernobyl was happening all over again.”

    Having followed this debate since Fukushima most frightening thing about nuclear power is that having strong opinions either for or against it seems to make otherwise intelligent people go barking mad.

    Why on earth would the Japanese government want to make people think that Chernobyl was happening all over again?

    1. The Kan government was never in favor of nuclear energy. They were also being criticized for their response to the reality on the ground after the massive earthquake and tsunami.

      Staging a “nuclear disaster” – even if all that was happening was response to an industrial situation caused by damage from natural forces furthered to agenda items; scaring people about nuclear energy and distracting them from recognizing other failures.

  4. Hmm, no doubt this shrill NYT times piece plays to the ignorant and fearful anti-nuclear brigade.

    I find it fascinating that we call it “The Fukushima Disaster” – yet the earthquake and tsunami (which actually killed the 15,000+ people as opposed to the zero people killed by the reactor disaster ) is really the tohoku earthquake – as it was off this prefecture (north of Fukushima) where the epicentre lay and where most of the people were killed and displaced.

    The reality is Fukushima showed, if you look at the WHOLE picture, that modern reactor designs properly managed stand up well even to enormous eathquakes and tsunamis. Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant (some 11-12km away from the so-called Fukushima disaster) which was 10 years younger sufferred ZERO damage. There were two other nuclear “incidents” of which I am aware associated with the earthquake – a fire in the turbine section of the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant which was soon controlled but the plant was temporarily shut down as a precaution – and at the number 2 reactor at Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant (to the south of fukushima and similar age or older than Fukushima) which was shut down automaticallybecauseit was reported that a cooling system pump for this reactor had stopped working (although a backup was in place and worked). Interestingly both these plants were closer to the coast than Fukushima – the tsunami height on the coast was lower (but only marginally at Onagawa and allowing for the relative inland depth was broadly comparable.

    I would suggest opposing nuclear power on the basis of Fukushima (and/or Chernobyl) is like opposing the use of the automobile for personal transport because of the record of the Ford Pinto (which had a distressing tendency to burst into flames if rear ended). We recognize the irrationality of that – we still buy and use automobiles because most of them are well designed and “safe”.

    To draw another analogy it’s like opposing the use of rail based public transport because of the granville train disaster. Yet we still travel on trains because of the real benefits they provide.

    Whilst nuclear has its genuine issues it remains a proven reliable power generation technology that offers us a way out of the AGW dilema – potentially much more catastrophic than the Tohoku earthquake distaster – and should be part of any rational discussion of the appropriate mix of solutions.

    The NYT does us all a disservice by its irrational promulgation of ill informed ignorant fear mongering

    1. Really solid remarks, very well put Mark. I agree, we need to do better in our thinking than this NYT effort.

      I usually draw on the Yugo for the car analogy, but the Pinto may be even better.

      Still can’t tempt you into some kind of guest post? 🙂

      1. Ben, you flatter me. I confess I have been busy lately with a house move and business matters. What would you have me post/write about? Develop my thesis about the industry itself having human/management shortcomings needing to be more transparent – as well as the problem with the either/or rather than this/and nuclear/renewables argument?

        1. I see the potential for two excellent posts there, and shorter rather than longer posts usually go down well (lesson I keep trying to learn). Challenge the readers, extend the discussion, and I will be very happy. I am not concerned about quality as far as you are concerned.

    2. I’m not sure what definition of “damage” you’re using to get “Fukushima 2 suffered zero damage”.

      I agree with the general point about global warming being worse, but I don’t think it helps pro-nuclear people to over-state their case. You end up just looking like the mirror image of the fear-mongering nutters. The hitch is that when the public distrust both the pro- and the anti- people because they both went overboard with the spin, we end up burning more coal.

        1. Of course I know that Fukushima 2 is a different power station to Fukushima 1 – I spent several days this time last year glued to my sodding telly, which had little red circles around both of them.

          What I’m not seeing is how you can call what happened at Fukushima 2 “no damage”. They even talk about the damage to the cooling systems in the article you linked to telling me there was no damage.

          Here’s a description of what was happening on the ground: Large numbers of workers, available because the earthquake considerately struck mid-afternoon on a weekday – hauling power cables around to improvise a power connection to get cooling back:

          What is true is that workers got the plant under control before it melted down. It’s not really clear that this was thanks to a more modern design rather than that one of the outside grid connections survived – as one did at Onnagawa, although the latter would have been in much better shape if it hadn’t as most of their backup generators survived too, because the plant was built higher above sea level, which is hopefully a feature of other newer plants too.

      1. edmundintokyo , in case you did not receive notification, please see my reply to Mark Harrigan below which includes a very important link relating to the technical differences of Daini that were influential in the very different outcome. Thanks also for being a first time commenter, I hope you keep coming back.

  5. Holy splitting hairs whilst ignoring the underlying point batman!

    Ok Edmund – will this form of words suit you better?

    “The other relevant plans which experiecned similar circumstances suffered minimal temporary damage and did not experience any longer term issues leading to a radiation problem”

    The the point is the other plants suffered no damage leading to any sort of issue of radiation leakage etc – of course if you want to split hairs go ahead. The relevant issue is that despite being in a similar circumstance to Fukushima 1 they survived relatively unscathed and caused no “nuclear” issues.

    You are correct that the Onagawa plant was higher above sea level (15m as opposed 10-11m for Daichi) – indeed there have been allegations made that Fuskushima Daiichi was built 10M below where it should have been –

    But this goes to the criticism of the nuclear industry that I have made many time to Ben – it lacks accountability and suffers from human rather than techical shortcomings

    But my point, which I do not think you have in any any way invalidated, is that if the press were to be balanced in their reporting (and if you were to be balanced in your appraisal and criticism), the fact that there were many other relatively proximal nuclear plants which experienced the same broad set of circumstances (mag 9 earthquake and 1 in a century tsunami) and yet did not have any serious issues – SHOULD be considered in any balanced appraisal of nuclear.

    So, what, exactly is the point are you trying to make? You accuse me of misrepresentation and being a nuclear booster/advocate (Ben will confirm that I am far from that and have been a frequent critic of the nuclear position) and yet you choose to obfuscate around an irrelevant detail?

    IF we are going to have a rational discussion about the nuclear option in addressing AGW then we need to consider its relative merits. My point, which I believe you have not in any way refuted, is that a full consideration of what really happened in the tohoku earthquake and subsequent damage to the relevant nucleaar power plants would lead one to conclude that nuclear is in fact a very ROBUST technology – exactly the opposite of the fear mongering and misrepresentation in the press.

    1. Reading your original post, I don’t think mentioning the fact that one of the non-Pinto cars was also smoking and came very close to catching fire too is obfuscating around an irrelevant detail.

    2. edmundintokyo’s pedantry, while a little annoying perhaps, most certainly has its place, particularly coming from someone who is prepared to give it in a form other than a full throated attack. One can only be grateful. On this occasion, I side with the pedant: “no damage” is to undermine the strength of the very good point you seek to make, and that needs to be made, about Daini. Which is this:

      The plant design certainly played a big, in fact key role in it withstanding the impact with such significantly smaller consequences. You can read all about it at the following link, and the schematics there really tell the story. In a nut shell, many more of the essential systems where within more robust protective containment. Share this link, everyone who gives a damn should read it

  6. Thanks for the link, Ben. But that piece is a good example of the kind of thing I’m bitching about.

    This person has written a decent-length blog post on way Fukushima 1 leaked radiation and Fukushima 2 didn’t, but doesn’t once mention – for example – the fact that while Dai-ichi lost all its grid connections, Dai-ni still had one functioning. Now for all I know there may be a case to make that the external grid connection was less important than it sounds, or that it was itself a product of better design rather than dumb luck. But the author doesn’t even try to make that case; They just skip over the fact that doesn’t fit their narrative.

    Now, we can argue about the ethics of writing a one-sided account like this; In fairness, these omissions are trivial compared to the outrageous lies that Helen Caldicott got the New York Times to print. But what strikes me about the spin I see from the pro-nuclear side of this debate is the sheer counter-productiveness of it. In this case some annoying pedant (not me in this case) mentions this at comment number 6, at which point the non-committed reader is likely left thinking they’re being spun a line, and wondering what else the author isn’t telling them.

    As a matter of communication strategy, this makes no sense. Note that the playing field is slanted against pro-nuclear people putting a rational case here, because when you’re spreading Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt like Calderwell et al, it probably _is_ an effective tactic to over-egg the pudding. If you’re operating at an emotional level rather than a rational one, it doesn’t really matter if from time to time the reader gets some more information and their thinking brain discounts what you’ve said; Their emotions have already digested it, and there’s nothing anyone can tell them to completely dissolve the FUD. But if you’re trying to talk to the brain and not the gut, you don’t have that luxury. I’ve been running into pro-nuclear articles that take what should be a strong point, rev it up beyond the red line in the hope of turning it into a devastatingly strong point, and burn out their engines in the process. I wish they wouldn’t.

    1. While I appreciate the sustained efforts of people like you to work on a purely rational level, I freely admit that I am taking some lessons from the success of those who play more to emotions than to facts.

      I care so strongly about the importance of breaking the dominance of fossil fuels on our lives that I want to succeed in sharing the good news about nuclear energy. I care more about the successful delivery of that message to a growing audience than I do about making sure that my delivery is 100% accurate. I can still take pride in my efforts if I am 90 or 95% accurate. That does not give the opposition ammunition; facts are not their strong suit.

      I agre that Dai-ni survived because it did not lose ALL sources of power. The lesson that I learn from that fact is that even a tiny amount of power that can drive a pump or a fan can keep shut down reactors from overheating, especially after they have been shut down for several hours. Another lesson that can be taken from Daiichi is that efforts to be perfect about never releasing ANY radioactive material were terribly self destructive; there was PLENTY of water available on the coastal site, but no way to push it into pressurized containments and pressure vessels.

      If the designers had questioned the value of a requirement to produce perfect, zero defect containment structures and instead built structures that contain 99% of the released material, the operators could have safely used the fact that boiling water away removes 500 times as much heat as heating water without boiling. Simple, low pressure hoses could provide all of the make-up required if they did not have to fight against pressure that was allowed to accumulate because designers and operators have been trained to do everything in their power to prevent the release of even minute quantities of radioactive material.

      They could also have taken advantage of the fact that hydrogen gas is lighter than air and will not accumulate if there is a planned, filtered escape path at the high point of any structure.

      The forces of evil aligned against the use of nuclear energy are not working for beneficial results, no matter what they say. Some might actually believe their drivel about the deadly effects of small amounts of radiation, but the master they are really serving is the global fossil fuel industry. That wealthy influencer of both politicians and advertiser-dependent media has seen its profits soar by at least $50 billion per year in the wake of the overreaction to Fukushima.

      That well-hyped event was actually a non-harmful release of radiation combined with a significant amount of site-contained damage. It was caused by natural forces on 30-40 year old industrial facilities located on a somewhat vulnerable site that had many positive features to recommend it.

      If the same effects had happened to a petroleum facility, no one would have heard much about it. In fact, far worse damage was sustained at the Cosmo Oil refinery in Chiba, just outside of Tokyo, but few people know that the fires raged there for 10 DAYs before they were brought under control.

      1. I sympathise Rod. Tragically, the reason they get as far as they do when they are clearly not interested in facts is that they are basically held to no standard by anyone. For some strange reason, the fact of being anti-nuclear grants them some status as being really, really, really concerned about the well being of others, therefore they are allowed to talk rubbish, basically, in the guise of being the good guy. We get no such grace at all and are forced to play by different rules.

        My observation is that we gain people more slowly, but when we gain them, we really gain them with a deep conviction because they see us put in the hard yards and the rigour. Many people I have encountered in my work who think they are “anti” actually only hold a fairly loose conviction to it.

        Which path? I don’t know but I’m grateful for edmundintokyo’s contribution.

      2. Ben – I am passionately in favor of using nuclear energy to enable better lives and a better environment. There is no reason to concede the “good guy” role or the high moral ground to the people who fight against a tool that is as empowering as fission.

        1. Of course you are. Through your writing I know you to be a deeply moral man, and a committed seeker of truth. I don’t concede anything… within myself. But when I address a roomful of people, I am not given the same starting point of moral high ground as the anti-nuclear activist, and I am scrutinised more carefully and subject to more criticism and doubt. It should not be that way, it just is. I regarded the other side as at best well meaning but misguided (e.g. me a couple of years ago) and at worst, in some select examples, downright crazy extremists. But the world does not view them that way. If I carry myself assuming they do, I will make mistakes. So I am far from apologetic in my demeanour and approach; I make it clear that I have expectations of the other guys, and I make the moral imperative clear early and often. If I am any good at this, and reports suggest that I am, then I should be safely approaching the “good guy” role within a few minutes of starting. In my experience to date, most people come around to it. But I don’t pretend to be given the same starting position.

      3. Ben – you are good at what you do. While I recognize that there are rooms where my approach may not be terribly welcome, I have a deep philosophical conviction that many of the most famous antinuclear activists have hidden their real motives.

        At least here in the US, there is a potential well of support for nuclear energy among the large groups of people who have never trusted the oil and gas companies, the banks, the Russians, the Saudis and big business interests that love keeping us addicted to fossil fuels.

        I teach people the importance of perceived energy scarcity to the profitability of fossil fuel interests. I also help them understand the damage that the concerted effort to suppress nuclear fission has caused for hard-working people who actually like taking part in enjoyable activities like family travel, boating, and living in comfortable, well air conditioned or heated homes. I notice that people begin to pay closer attention as I develop those lines of thought.

        Audiences start taking the logical steps toward recognizing some of the prosperous leaders of the antinuclear groups as wolves in sheep’s clothing that are actually promoting the interests of the petroleum pushers.

        That is how I work to assume the moral high ground from those who spend their time fighting against energy sources, advocating for conservation and making do with the energy we already have.

        Most of us have very few energy sources of our own; we regularly buy new fuel by the tank full. We also have to buy new electricity constantly. For those people who live close enough to coal transportation routes to notice the huge quantities of fuel moving to fill the power stations, I can help them to understand just what that means (nearly 50% of the electricity in the US comes from burning coal).

        Then I hold up a soda can or a few handfuls of simulated fuel pellets to show them how fission makes it possible for people to actually grasp and store all the energy they might ever need.

        I have to admit, however, that you have a public speaking and writing advantage that makes me just a little bit jealous.

        Unlike you, Gwyneth Cravens, Stewart Brand, Patrick Moore, and James Hansen, I can never claim to be a reformed antinuclear person. I’ve been strongly in favor of the technology ever since I started learning about energy – when I was about 8 years old.

        1. Sickly funny isn’t it? One of my great assets is that I used to disagree with myself!!!

          It takes me to funny places though. People have said to me that I should take more of an approach of “Look, I don’t really like nuclear either, it’s just that…”. The problem with that is that it is bullshit and I am too honest to lie to people. The more I learn about nuclear power, the more I like it, since the only way to judge ANYTHING is in comparison with the options. I plan to write about the way one’s thoughts evolve on this journey of mine.

          As we discussed in the pod cast we have different cultures and situations with regard to energy, and from what I understand I can grasp the effectiveness of your approach in your setting. I am a continual learner so I may try some of it, but for now I seem to be on a good thing with the Australian audiences. I hope to visit the US this year, maybe I will have a chance to visit and see you present?

    2. I am, overall, in furious agreement with you on this. I also just learned something about Daini, thanks. Frankly, feel free to police me. I was most pursuaded to switch sides by the rational and level headed performance of Barry Brook and Tom Blees in debate compared to David Noonan and Mark Diesendorf.

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